Courbet, incommensurate and emergent by Herbert, JD
UC Irvine
UC Irvine Previously Published Works
Title
Courbet, incommensurate and emergent
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9xb2k9gv
Journal
Critical Inquiry, 40(2)
ISSN
0093-1896
Author
Herbert, JD
Publication Date
2014-12-01
DOI
10.1086/674118
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
Courbet, Incommensurate and Emergent
Author(s): James D. Herbert
Source: Critical Inquiry, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Winter 2014), pp. 339-381
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/674118 .
Accessed: 05/01/2014 15:29
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
 .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 .
The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Critical
Inquiry.
http://www.jstor.org 
This content downloaded from 128.195.73.16 on Sun, 5 Jan 2014 15:29:47 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Courbet, Incommensurate and Emergent
James D. Herbert
The daubs crowding the canvases of Gustave Courbet, according to
critical accounts of the day, gesture in two, potentially antithetical direc-
tions. Because they persist as physical traces of his method of painting,
these signature patches of paint—thick, loose, larded on by brush or pal-
ette knife—bespeak the sensibility, perhaps even the soul, of the energetic
artist who laid them on canvas. Simultaneously, owing to their resem-
blance when clustered together to sitter or landscape (though it is mostly
the late landscapes that will concern us here, along with an extended con-
cluding look at the enormous Painter’s Studio), they also evoke the slices of
reality they depict. This doubled operation of painterly representation ac-
tivates both an autobiographical cause (in semiotic terms, an index) point-
ing toward the artist and a realist resemblance (semiotically, an icon)
bearing a likeness to the world. The resulting interplay promises a grand
synthesis whereby the mind and world can be brought into appropriate
correspondence through the medium of art. The potent admixture was
hardly attributed to Courbet alone. Indeed, the combination vested the
corpulent brushstroke with perhaps the greatest ideological construct of
the visual fine arts—by which I mean a dominant yet unexamined and
unquestioned axiom underlying a substantial body of cultural thought
over an extended period—at a time when Paris stood as the cultural capital
of Europe, spanning in application from at least Euge`ne Delacroix’s ren-
ditions of the exotic Orient at the beginning of the nineteenth century until
Pablo Picasso’s fundamental recasting of the meaning of technique at the
beginning of the twentieth. That powerful idea maintained that the indi-
Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
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vidual artist, liberated from the thematic expectations and technical pro-
tocols of established artistic institutions such as the Acade´mie and the
E´cole des Beaux-Arts, could capture a segment of lived experience of the
real world and claim it as his own.1 Art critic and novelist E´mile Zola
provided the lapidary definition of painting under the aegis of this con-
ceptual regime in his review of the salon of 1866: “A work of art is a corner
of creation seen through a temperament.”2 Courbet, active at a time when
the felicitous conjunction of perceiving self and perceived world had al-
ready become an established critical convention, worked with a conspicu-
ity of method that made his brushstrokes ideal vehicles for the conceit
(Zola, in fact, immediately followed his definition with a discussion of
Courbet’s contribution to the salon). Consequently, the painter from Or-
nans stood forth as an early exemplar of the ambitious French painter
ascribed with something close to full artistic autonomy in control of his
own world—a status underwritten, appropriately, by both biographical
difference and geographic distance from Parisian artistic norms.
However, this ideological formulation depended in turn on an indis-
pensable assumption: that artist, painting, and subject matter always re-
mained, in some sense, commensurate with one another. How else could
brushstroke serve as an adequate representation for both creative individ-
ual and depicted scene? Only once the three had been established as dif-
ferent enough to constitute distinct entities yet as similar enough to allow
meaningful juxtaposition could the strands of representation (of whatever
semiotic stripe: indexical cause, iconic resemblance, whatever) be drawn
between them. The implied appropriation of sites by the artist, and by
extension by the art audience, hangs on such assumed commensurability;
Courbet’s interpretations of, say, the Normandy coast or of the forests of
Franche-Comte´ as captured on his painterly canvases become ours for the
1. I am exploring this broader theme in a book manuscript nearing publication entitled
Brushstroke and Emergence: Courbet, Impressionism, Picasso.
2. E´mile Zola, “Mon Salon: Les Re´alistes du salon,” Mes Haines: Causeries litte´raires et
artistiques (Paris, 1879), p. 307. The essay is also reprinted in Zola, E´crits sur l’art, ed. Jean-Pierre
Leduc-Adine (Paris, 1991), pp. 120–25.
J A M E S D . H E R B E R T is professor of art history and cofounder of the PhD
program in visual studies at the University of California, Irvine. He has
published three books: Fauve Painting: The Making of Cultural Politics (1992);
Paris 1937: Worlds on Exhibition (1998); and Our Distance from God: Studies of the
Divine and the Mundane in Western Art and Music (2008). He is currently
completing a book manuscript entitled Brushstroke and Emergence: Courbet,
Impressionism, Picasso.
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viewing. The real ideological work was performed not by any particular
mapping of corresponding elements between entities—about that sort of
thing endless debate raged as critics tussled over the strength and merits of
the semiotic (pragmatic and semantic) filaments binding the three—but
by the largely unquestioned acceptance of the possibility of meaningful
connections linking artistic temperament, painted brushstroke, and realist
subject matter. That commensurability may seem somewhat self-evident
to many of us, but only because we ourselves are its ideological heirs.
(During prerevolutionary centuries in France, by way of counterexample,
royal patron and historical theme would have mirrored each other in com-
mensurate glory, against which the persona, experience, and craft of the
artist could not have hoped to offer even the most meager of measure.)
Any perspicacious analysis of Courbet’s paintings, both for their own
sake and as archetypes of the muscular brushstroke during the early adult-
hood of its illustrious century-long lifespan, need probe not only the
strands of representation extending out from them—different ones pro-
posed by different critics—but also this underlying assumption of com-
mensurability shared by them all. A set of theoretical tools from outside
the usual domain of art history, derived from the philosophy of mind and
from the nascent science of complexity, will help elucidate the ways in
which self, stroke, and subject matter can, paradoxically, neither be clearly
distinguished each from the others nor flattened out to occupy the same
ground upon which their commensurability can then be posited. The con-
cept of emergence will prove especially useful in exploring how these three
entities active in Courbet’s paintings operate at incommensurate levels
that, while hardly disconnected from each other, never allow the reduction
of one to the status of necessary and sufficient explicans to the explicandum
of the other. To be sure, this same dynamic pertains as well to the method
I employ: I no more treat Courbet’s painting as adequate illustrations of
cognitive functions than I would pretend that the properties of emergence
fully account for the paintings. (I make no spurious claims, for instance,
that ideas about complexity from the twenty-first century were already
somehow anticipated or prefigured within scientific thought of the nine-
teenth century, a gambit that would serve no purpose beyond conforming
to existing scholarly protocols for establishing common ground for com-
parison between artist, artifact, and context.) At times, my analysis may
take disconcerting leaps from, say, exacting descriptions of individual
brushstrokes to general discussions of neurons and such. An approach
that, even as it tests out possible connections between their different reg-
isters, recognizes an underlying lack of easy correspondence between his-
torical artifacts and its own theoretical models stands a much better chance
Critical Inquiry / Winter 2014 341
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of wresting open ideological assumptions of commensurability embedded
in the past.
During one of his numerous excursions to the Normandy coast during
the 1860s, Courbet presumably witnessed a waterspout, a tornado-like
funnel of spray rising above the sea during a storm. The maritime oddity
was to figure in a number of his subsequent canvases, including The
Waterspout, Etretat of around 1870 (fig. 1). Despite the initial resemblance
between painting and shoreline experience, the recalcitrant details of this
painting (and other canvases like it) quickly frustrate any attempt to regard
the image as straightforward ocean-meteorological reportage. Consider
the piling-up of pigments in the lower left quadrant that is meant to rep-
resent the spray of foam thrown up by the crash of waves. In the depths of
the picture at the right half of the first wave and with almost all of the
second and third breakers, the application of paint achieves a degree of
visual verisimilitude as Courbet’s grays and whites replicate aquatic tur-
bulence and aeration. These brushstrokes, many smooth and curved, re-
semble the actual curling shape of the watery crests. Yet the left, foremost
section of the first wave bears little likeness to water; the artist, it would
seem, pushed this patch of paint hard into the support with his palette
knife. Its flattened expanse conforms to the surface of the picture plane
rather than the slightly receding angle of the breaker, while the ruffled
variegations along its edges capture more the viscosity of pigment-laden
oil medium than the sparkling of ocean mists. Further to the right along
the bottom edge of the picture, but also higher up where waves splash
against rocks, Courbet’s whites in like manner repeatedly flatten against
the picture plane, quashing any illusion of depth, or congeal into clots and
corrugations of paint. Indeed, it is as if these palette-knife curds build up
momentum from the center of the picture to break, with the energy of art,
from right to left into the leading crest of foremost wave, thereby over-
whelming the thematic trajectory of brushed swells trying to push left to
right. Throughout most of this expanse of curdled sea, the material of the
rendering is simply too heavy and coarse to convincingly pass itself off as
churning liquid.
By the 1860s, critics knew without a second thought how to interpret
such conspicuous traces of forceful execution, and the habitual phrases
practically wrote themselves. “My Courbet is simply a personality,” wrote
Zola in 1866, keen on tempe´rament. Recalling the painter’s works from
earlier decades, the critic enthused: “Stocky and vigorous, he had the raw
desire to clutch real nature in his arms.”3 (We will return later to the second
3. Zola, “Les Chutes,” Mes Haines, p. 312; hereafter abbreviated “C.”
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valence in Zola’s formulation, that this extraordinary personality chose to
embrace “real nature.”) And if the works on display at the salon of 1866 did
not fully live up to that earlier promise, it was because the pictures fell
short of the person: “I hardly deny that The Roe Deer’s Shelter [similar
to The Roe Deer’s Shelter in Winter (fig. 5)] has great charm and much
life; but [it] lacks that ‘certain something’ of power and will that is
Courbet in his entirety” (“C,” p. 313). Thick brushstrokes evoke Cour-
bet firstly because he brought them into being; but paint and person-
ality also shared resemblance, for such adjectives as trapu and vigoureux
implicitly applied equally to both.
The critic Camille Lemonnier added to the argument by drawing out
the biographical overtones of Courbet’s preferred method of paint appli-
cation. “The knife is the crude instrument of the manual laborer; it is
without conscious thought, irresponsible, mechanical.”4 The thickness of
the paints records the extended period Courbet “labor[ed]” on the surface.
Lemonnier’s account builds on the notorious artist’s uncouth public per-
sona and political radicalism to carry the connotations of this simple stu-
dio tool deep into the territory of class. The palette knife marks Courbet as
a man of le peuple. Such a characterization condescendingly imposes lim-
itations, but also portends virtues. The marvels of pictorial illusion, per-
fected over centuries at the Acade´mie and E´cole and in Courbet’s day best
personified at the salon by the precise and polished Jean-Le´on Ge´roˆme,
had developed to such a point that it indicated to many commentators an
artistic overrefinement, even a capacity for duplicity. “All of that is a scin-
tillating trap [le miroir aux alouettes],” complained the critic Louis Gallet
in 1865 about Ge´roˆme’s painting, indirectly evoking the myth of Zeuxis
and the duped birds; “it is the forgetting of true art, large and firm in its
expression; it is thought sacrificed to minute detail; it is the triumph of
routine technique [me´tier].”5 Courbet’s pictures might be coarsely mate-
rial, they might carry their message all on the surface, but for all that—
perhaps because of all that—they maintain an aura of authenticity
associated with good, honest labor. The palette knife and the bulky patches
of paint it leaves behind guarantee the painter’s sincerity because the
worker-artist is sure to remain guileless. Critic Fernand Desnoyers insisted
that “all forms of trickery are banished from Courbet’s pictures.”6
4. Camille Lemonnier, G. Courbet et son œuvre (Paris, [1878]), p. 62; hereafter abbreviated
GC. The date appears on the title page as “M DCCC LXVIII,” but 1868 cannot be correct
because Lemonnier refers to the death of Courbet, which happened on the last day of 1877. I
surmise that the printer omitted an X in the date on the title page.
5. Louis Gallet, Salon de 1865: Peinture, sculpture (Paris, 1865), p. 12.
6. Fernand Desnoyers, Salon des refuse´s: La Peinture en 1863 (Paris, 1863), p. 21.
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We could say, then, that brushstrokes, in some sense involving both the
vestiges of labor and the recognition of temperamental similitudes, repre-
sent Courbet the man: his plebian and rustic origins, his loutish but ingen-
uous persona, his authentic vigor. Yet this formulation, the grounds for
decades of critical and art-historical evaluation, may presuppose an easy
division between self and surface that a close examination of the processes
of painting may well not bear out. Before we can consider the relation
between sensibility and painted canvas, however, we must first reflect on
the closer connection between the thoughts of the artist and the physical
gestures he makes that leave those strokes as traces of his actions.
The standard Cartesian formulation of mind and body, John Hauge-
land points out (expanding on ideas earlier explored by Hubert L. Drey-
fus), posits the two as separate components within a larger system,
components distinguished from each other by great internal complexity
and with a relatively simple “narrow-bandwidth” interface between them,
through which thought becomes transducted (transmitted and translated)
into action.7 As an illustrative comparison, Haugeland observes that we
make sense of a television not by slicing it arbitrarily along regularly spaced
planes but rather by distinguishing individual parts (picture tube, capaci-
tor, resistor) that, while potentially internally complex to perform their
specified function, nevertheless are connected to each other in relatively
simple ways (wires). If mind and body are separate components in this
manner, the mind must contain a conceptual model of the body, a repre-
sentation of it, that it mentally manipulates to plan action before convey-
ing instructions to the parts of the body corresponding to the model. This
may be an accurate description when one is first learning a task or antici-
pating a carefully deliberated act. Learning to drive, for instance, you may
consciously decide (or be instructed) that you will be placing your hands at
10:00 and 2:00, and in your mind you imagine that configuration, com-
plete with an internal picture of your upper limbs, before you execute it.
But this simply will not do as an account of the behaviors of a skilled
expert.8 Experts have been habituated by many previous instances of sim-
7. John Haugeland, “Mind Embodied and Embedded” (1995), Having Thought: Essays in
the Metaphysics of Mind (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), p. 220; hereafter abbreviated “MEE.”
8. The transition from novice to expert is a topic examined by Dreyfus, and Haugeland
quotes him directly: “Generally, in acquiring a skill—in learning to drive, dance, or pronounce
a foreign language, for example—at first we must slowly, awkwardly, and consciously follow the
rules. But then there comes a moment when we finally transfer control to the body [“can
perform automatically” (Dreyfus, What Computers Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason, rev.
ed. [New York, 1979], p. 248; quoted in “MEE,” p. 224)]. At this point we do not seem to be
simply dropping these same rigid rules into unconsciousness; rather we seem to have picked up
the muscular gestalt which gives our behavior a new flexibility and smoothness” (Dreyfus,
Critical Inquiry / Winter 2014 345
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ilar actions to respond to stimuli by performing certain ingrained behav-
iors. They needn’t think; they needn’t plan the action; they needn’t
represent it. If I were to ask you, after you execute an automotive right turn
(assuming you are no longer a novice and now possess driving competence
as a habituated skill), where you had placed your hands during each step in
the process, you simply could not tell me—and not because you’ve forgot-
ten but because the placement of hands never occupied a place in your
mental model to be remembered in the first place. The action TURNING
RIGHT does not exist as a representation to be called up in the mind and sent
off as fresh signals to the hands when occasion arises; it exists as a complex,
“high-bandwidth” collection of neural pathways passing rapidly between
brain and body, strengthened by each repeated use. Dreyfus writes (in
conjunction with his brother Stuart, a mathematician and computer en-
gineer): “As the active body acquires skills, those skills are ‘stored,’ not as
representations in the mind, but as dispositions to respond to the solicita-
tions of situations in the world.”9 As a result, concludes Haugeland, “the
activity of the [hands] should not be regarded as ‘decoding neural mes-
sages’, but rather as an integral part of the ‘processing’ that the brain and
other neurons also contribute to. . . . The neural pathways from perception
to action are high-bandwidth all the way through” (“MEE,” pp. 226, 228).
What Computers Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason [New York, 1972], pp. 160–61;
hereafter abbreviated WC). See also Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus, “Five Steps from
Novice to Expert,” Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era
of the Computer (New York, 1986), pp. 16–51.
9. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus, “The Challenge of Merleau-Ponty’s
Phenomenology of Embodiment for Cognitive Science,” in Perspectives on Embodiment: The
Intersections of Nature and Culture, ed. Gail Weiss and Honi Fern Haber (New York, 1999), p.
103. The Dreyfuses are summarizing the ideas of Merleau-Ponty, but it is clear that they endorse
this assessment themselves. In a parallel fashion, Antonio Damasio argues that the mind stores
experience in emotions. “Different options for action and different future outcomes become
associated with different emotions/feelings. By virtue of those associations, when a situation
that fits the profile of a certain category is revisited in our experience, we rapidly and
automatically deploy the appropriate emotions. . . . The emotional signal can operate entirely
under the radar of consciousness. It can produce alterations in working memory, attention, and
reasoning so that the decision-making process is biased toward selecting the action most likely
to lead to the best possible outcome, given prior experience” (Antonio Damasio, Looking for
Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain [Orlando, Fla., 2003], pp. 146–47, 148–49). Elsewhere,
Damasio concludes: “Outsourcing expertise to the nonconscious space is what we do when we
hone a skill so finely that we are no longer aware of the technical steps needed to be skillful. We
develop skills in the clear light of consciousness, but then we let them go underground, into the
roomy basement of our minds, where they do not clutter the exiguous square footage of
conscious reflection space” (Damasio, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain
[New York, 2010], p. 275). See also Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human
Brain (New York, 1994), and Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? ed. Susan Pockett, William P.
Banks, and Shaun Gallagher (Cambridge, Mass., 2006).
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Thus, it makes no sense to regard mind and body as separate components
when it comes to assessing skilled action (as inert organs they may still be
regarded as separate components; but that is a different context, focusing
on anatomy rather than neurology); skilled action binds them together
with too much “intimacy” (Haugeland’s term, meaning “commingling or
integralness”) to allow such differentiation (“MEE,” p. 208).
Courbet, a skilled artist with an enormous accretion of habituated pro-
cedures, takes up the task of painting a picture and moves his body to do
so. Surely he begins the project with a general mental schema for the pic-
ture, inventing a composition or, more likely in the case of The Waterspout,
Etretat, choosing one perception of the world among many as worthy of
copy. But that is not how he executes. He does not, before he acts, concoct
a mental representation of how he will position his thumb in relation to his
fingers, or how he will pivot his wrist or bend his elbow, or how he will
swing his left hand, holding the palette, towards his right, holding the
brush. Of course, he does ponder his next steps (neurons firing away in the
brain), but those deliberations probably take the form of thoughts such as
“that area of water is getting too dark,” or “I like that texture enough to let
it expand leftwards,” and then the automatic protocols for LIGHTENING or
ROUGHENING activate and hands execute, even as mind may move onto its
next consideration.
As with hands, so with the tools of palette and brush. Mid-concerto
Joshua Bell has no idea where his bow may be; Tiger Woods pays no heed
to the location of his club mid-swing (were they to stop and think about it,
they would surely falter). And, as he paints, Courbet might well be unable to
report which particular brush he has in hand or even, when he is deeply em-
broiled in the process, if he is using brush or knife. Michael Polanyi, quoted by
Dreyfus, argues: “While we rely on a tool or a probe, these are not handled as
external objects. . . . They remain necessarily on our side, . . . forming part of
ourselves, the operating persons. We pour ourselves out into them and assim-
ilate them as parts of our existence. We accept them existentially by dwelling in
them.”10 In just this manner, Courbet resides in the tools of his trade and gives
them no more conscious thought when painting than he would attend to his
fingers when scratching his head.
As with palette and brush, so with painted surface. Each new patch of
pigment takes up its place in relation to previous daubs, Courbet’s artistic
process constantly gaining momentum and embarking in new directions
10. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (1958; New
York, 1964), p. 59; quoted, in slightly altered form, in WC, p. 164.
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from the feedback loops that spontaneously form among them.11 It is not
just that the surface provides a wall of resistance against which gesturing
hand and brush (or hand/brush, as a unit) affirm their trajectory and
heft—like a swimmer whose precise movements would collapse into inef-
fectual flailing were it not for the weight of surrounding water against
which each stroke presses. It is also that the accumulation of previous
brushstrokes define the local situation into which the new smear must
enter. Let us imagine Courbet at work: The eye focuses down on an in-
complete patch, the brush or knife sweeps across the palette to pick up
some mixture of pigments, the tip or blade darts to the surface where it
deposits what the ongoing process dictates will fit in best with the set of
strokes immediately at hand. The earlier brushstrokes stand as a record for
ready reference of decisions reached in previous cycles of the ongoing
operation. The latest application acts on the earlier ones by revising them
or even covering them up, but the earlier ones also act upon the latest by
prompting from it an immediate response to the proximate environment
(thus LIGHTENING and ROUGHENING and such are always dynamic, rather
than prescribed, operations). We might thus regard physical paint accu-
mulating on the canvas as creativity congealed, a materially manifested
memory of the process of painting extending over time. “My memories are
inscribed in the things around me,” Dreyfus maintains (WC, p. 178). As
well as in the literal sense, slowly drying paint is sticky in this mnemonic
manner.
Brain to body; body to hand; hand to brush; brush to canvas: it’s “high
bandwidth” all the way down, a single, unified mental/material continuum
not cleanly subdivided into differentiated components. This unity, lacking
the interposition of bottleneck interfaces across which transduction might
take place, greatly complicates the representational status of the brush-
stroke. Representation, after all, is itself in most cases a form of transduc-
tion (above all with the recording of ideas in symbolic words): a coding of
pertinent information from original to transcription. The patches of paint
on The Waterspout, Etretat, then, can’t really represent Courbet’s artistic
process because they are Courbet’s artistic process. It is not as if that pro-
cess exists over there somewhere (in the man’s brain, for instance), which
this paint on canvas then reiterates over here in some derivative form. At
best, this instance of representation depends on the trope of synecdoche,
part for whole, rather than metonymy, effect for cause. But even synecdo-
che is a suspect label because this part—the brushstroke, both accretion of
11. Daniel M. Herbert investigates similar cycles between thought and drawing in Daniel
M. Herbert, Architectural Study Drawings (New York, 1993).
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decisions and durable final product—is so completely integrated to the
whole of the artistic process that it hardly can qualify as independent rep-
resentation. Would we say that a book without its cover represents that
book or is that book itself? Of course we could maintain, as countless critics
and art historians have done over the decades, that the brushstrokes evoke
more than just artistic process to represent a greater something, Courbet
the man: the words he uttered, the lovers and friendships he pursued, the
Vendoˆme Column he pulled down; ultimately (the argument implies), his
transcendent soul. Yet that formulation completely begs the question be-
cause it presupposes some necessary connection between man and process
that must be taken utterly on faith once the two have been differentiated
the one from the other. The proper noun Courbet, referring to both living
creature and artistic process, offers up only a false unity. Is there any
ground for believing that the biographical man is “vigorous,” much less
“stocky,” just because his brushstrokes happen to be? Imagine if the man
Courbet happened to be frail in body and lazy in comportment; it’s still
possible that he could have applied paint to canvas with the same thickness
and e´lan. The only aspects of Courbet about which the brushstrokes can
speak, namely, how he paints, are precisely those from which they cannot
be distinguished.
Fine and good: Courbet’s brushstrokes are his artistic process, not a
representation of it. But surely representation functions well in other as-
pects of the picture; The Waterspout, Etretat, after all, represents a section
of the Normandy coast because it resembles (metaphor rather than me-
tonymy, icon rather than index) that particular collection of water and
rocks. Such a claim is undeniable about the general composition; some
sort of transduction between actual shoreline and painted seascape has
certainly taken place—although the breadth of the bandwidth of such
visual, as opposed to linguistic or symbolic, representation is debatable, an
issue we will not be pursuing. We are here considering Courbet’s brush-
strokes, not his composition. How do they represent the seascape at Etretat
or fail to do so?
We have already seen how the palette-knife scrapings in the lower left
and center of The Waterspout, Etretat do not much resemble water. Tech-
nique manages a better match further right, where the canvas depicts
Etretat’s rocky bluffs. The correspondence, however, would seem to be
more tactile than visual—not surprising at a time when precise visual
replication inevitably raised the prospect of Ge´roˆme’s manner of overly
studied duplicity (nature transducted through the Acade´mie, as it were).
To the right, pigments of ochre and bitumen body forth with much the
same texture as Etretat’s cliffs of calcium carbonate. The critics noticed.
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“He felt himself drawn by his very flesh . . . toward the material world that
surrounded him,” marveled Zola in 1866. “He wanted to paint in a way that
was meaty and earthy. . . . If I shut my eyes, I see again those energetic
canvases, of a single mass, constructed of lime and sand, so real as to be
truth itself.”12 Lime and sand! Courbet works the same sort of terrestrial
materials across the surface of his canvas that he chose to depict. A carica-
ture by Andre´ Gill in 1868 literalizes the metaphor by replacing Courbet’s
palette knife with a full-size mason’s trowel (fig. 2). So, too, did Lemonni-
er’s characterization of the artist; evoking Courbet’s Stone Breakers of 1849,
made famous at the salon of 1850–51, he wrote: “Courbet was the stone
breaker of his art, like those he painted” (GC, pp. 25–26). Painting a picture
in the manner of Courbet is akin to working the rocks and mortars of this
hard world.
Water presents greater challenges, a bit further of a stretch. There can be
no question of trickery, of passing off pasty pigments as liquids able to
slosh and splash. How, then, to make a tactile match while remaining
honest to both medium and subject matter? Courbet could not change the
actual substance of either painting or world, but he could search out what-
ever physical attributes they might share, despite their differences. Con-
sider again the lower left of The Waterspout, Etretat. Paint may not atomize
like seawater and water may not corrugate like the edges of these patches of
paint, but they both fragment, and Courbet gives us that. Paint may not
flow nor water congeal, but they both have their density, and Courbet gives
us that. The Waterspout, Etretat and many of the artist’s other late land-
scapes preserve a certain integrity of material (their own and the world’s)
by featuring those aspects of the world that resemble his paints.
Lemonnier, though his rhetorical figures here are prone to gallop away
from him, seems to have perceived the general tendency. “Water fills the
middle of these landscapes with sheets of silver, bubbling with foam. Cour-
bet gives them density rather than transparency. . . . At times . . . these
splendid seascapes resemble incrustations of marble and metal, the waves
rear up like horses, and the foam, which flattens at its points, crumbles
apart like shards of marble being shaped by the blows of a mallet” (GC, pp.
51, 58). Despite the fact that the critic relies on extraneous equine entities to
establish the similarity, he does firm up the fluid to find its common
ground with the dried oil paints before his eyes. Courbet’s choice of tools,
Lemonnier argued, reinforced the tendency. “The palette knife . . . freezes
12. The words “flesh” and “meaty” disclose the second trajectory of Zola’s argument, which
(because we are not considering the nudes) need not concern us here: Courbet also embraces
the materiality of “plump women” (“C,” pp. 311–12).
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the moisture out of the paint, and replaces the porosity of life with the
hardness of marble and metal. It . . . materialize[s] all that it touches” (GC,
p. 62). So, the artist doesn’t try to fool us into believing that his paints
possess properties that they do not in order get them to correspond to the
characteristics of nature. Rather, he features in nature only those charac-
teristics that correspond to the real properties of his paints.
Nothing confirms this predilection for matching world to canvas more
than Courbet’s idiosyncratic selection of subject matter. A calm sea lies
flat, and (unlike many other artists) Courbet rarely depicts it. Only during
a tempest, the painter’s preferred weather, does water rise up to form a
F I G U R E 2 . Andre´ Gill, “G. Courbet,” Le Petit Figaro, 14 June 1868. Reproduced in Courbet
selon les caricatures et les images, ed. Charles Le´ger (Paris, 1920), p. 78.
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vertical face. Lemonnier was wrong: Courbet’s waves don’t rear up like
horses, they rise up like the painted surface of a canvas hanging on the wall.
Even more so do his cloud-filled skies. What, after all, is a waterspout, this
thing that Courbet chose to feature? A remarkable condition in which
water, against its nature, stands vertical. In almost all cases, however, a
spout remains a single funnel of swirling vapor, a mere line, not a plane.
Only on extraordinary occasions—we have no way to know whether
Courbet actually happened to witness such an event along the Normandy
coast—do a row of waterspouts form, but even then they never conjoin
into a single entity. So where is the titular waterspout in Courbet’s painting
from Etretat? We might be tempted to locate it in the column of lighter sky
to the right of center, but a spout would appear dark against light, not the
reverse; this streak of paint reads better as a shaft of sunlight breaking
through the clouds. More likely candidates are the dark streaks further left
that all but join together to form a curtain. Gustave Randon had already
captured the gist in 1867 in his illustration “A Waterspout; Audaces tromba
juvat” (substituting tromba, close to the French trombe meaning “water-
spout,” for fortuna in Virgil’s phrase “Fortune favors the bold”), a carica-
ture of the relatively more meteorologically accurate painting The
Waterspout of 1866, shown at the salon of 1867 (figs. 3–4). Where the earlier
painting still allowed the discernment of discrete funnels, the canvas from
1870 treats the background sky, like the waves in the fore- and middle
ground, as a solid wall of dark water.
To give preference to things that match the properties of painting, to
render those aspects of them that correspond to qualities of the medium:
such an approach would seem to risk the homogenization of the world into
the stuff of art. But that does not happen, owing to the great variety of
color, texture, and sheen achievable in oils—even in spite of Lemonnier’s
qualms that Courbet’s palette knife “substitutes uniformity for variety” in
comparison to the brush (GC, p. 62). Such is the virtue of oil painting, and
Courbet exploits the full range of its possible effects to bestow his canvases
with marked heterogeneity. In The Waterspout, Etretat, for instance, the
scintillating asperity of the white foreground foam contrasts with the
course earthiness of the middle-ground rocks, while both stand out against
the field of smooth, matte streaks that make up the background rain and
spouts. Edmond About, reviewing the salon of 1866, proclaimed: “No one
excels more than [Courbet] in rendering the diverse surfaces of things. His
painting, as supple as it is solid, accommodates to even the most compli-
cated demands of execution.”13 Added Jules-Antoine Castagnary, critic
13. Edmond About, Salon de 1866 (Paris, 1867), p. 45.
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and friend of the artist, writing in 1863: “His way of working, which is
wonderfully rich, accommodates itself to differentiate each object that it
treats.”14 If anything, Courbet’s multifarious technique tends toward a dis-
articulation of the image, one part from another. Nature, like painting,
consists of a great collection of disparate elements that may draw together,
but may also drift apart. No aesthetic or atmospheric envelope supersedes
to unify the material qualities of either picture or physical world.
Courbet not only has substituted one form of iconic resemblance for
another, tactile for visual. He also has, in a sense, reversed the usual direc-
tion of representational similitude. More than having the picture strive to
look like the world, Courbet selects for inclusion in his canvas only those
aspects of the world that physically resemble his paints. Yet with that re-
14. Jules-Antoine Castagnary, Salons, 1857–70 (Paris, 1892), p. 149.
F I G U R E 3 . Gustave Randon, “A Waterspout; Waterspout Favors the Bold,” Le Journal
Amusant, 1867. Reproduced in Courbet selon les caricatures et les images, ed. Charles Le´ger
(Paris, 1920), p. 72.
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versal, the process of representation itself tends to dissipate because it
becomes difficult, perhaps impossible, to distinguish paints from earth
and even from water. If representation consists of a present signifier stand-
ing in for an absent signified, then The Waterspout, Etretat, paradoxically,
lacks the absence of real material to be worked; it’s already there. “Lime
and sand”: Courbet does not record rock and stone; he piles up and pushes
about just those substances across the surface of his canvas. He paints his
picture as he lives his life, dealing with stuff.
Once again, Haugeland and Dreyfus come to our aid. “Perception is
cheap,” writes Haugeland, “representation expensive” (“MEE,” p. 219). For
routinized activities it is simply more efficient to come to grips directly
with the world—both perceive it and act upon it, to expand Haugeland’s
maxim—than it is to transduct it from world to mental representation and
then transduct it back again into deeds. Haugeland recalls the slogan of
artificial intelligence expert Rodney Brooks, “the world is its own best
model” (quoted in “MEE,” p. 219);15 and continues by quoting (and exten-
sively analyzing) a key passage from Dreyfus: “When we are at home in the
world, the meaningful objects embedded in their context of references
among which we live are not a model of the world stored in our mind or
15. See Rodney A. Brooks, “Elephants Don’t Play Chess,” Robotics and Autonomous Systems
6 (1990): 5.
F I G U R E 4 . Gustave Courbet, The Waterspout (1866). Oil on canvas, 43 66 cm.
Philadelphia Museum of Art. Photo: Philadelphia Museum of Art.
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brain; they are the world itself ” (quoted in “MEE,” p. 231; see WC, pp.
177–78). In essence, the high-bandwidth chain linking mind to body to
canvas extends onwards from there into the world, and it would be as
meaningless to distinguish canvas from cliff as discrete components within
Courbet’s representational system as it would be to distinguish his mind
from his hand. (This, I take it, rather than visual resemblance, is the prin-
cipal characteristic defining his realism.) The picture does not represent
how the painter copes with the world, it is how he copes with the world.
The artistic process embodied in his corpulent brushstrokes that goes by
the name Courbet, far from distancing itself from the material world and
making either a mental model of it in the brain or a painted likeness of it on
canvas, resides deeply imbedded within that world itself.
Up to now, it may seem that in presenting this description of Courbet
(the name for an artistic process) as the deep integration of mind and body
and world I am discounting the possibility of differentiation, of the pres-
ence of incommensurate elements within a particular collection of paint-
ings. That is not the case. Instances of disruptive irregularity do appear in
these works, but mapped onto a different axis, as it were: not along the
high-bandwidth spectrum stretching horizontally from synapse to ocean
spray, but rather arising vertically to manifest themselves at higher levels,
incommensurate with the lower-level network. Here entities, including
even subjects, emerge that, while remaining at least partially causally con-
nected, cannot be reduced to or explained by the network of intimate
interactions extending outward from the brushstroke.
At first glance, Courbet’s late inland landscapes would appear to provide
prime evidence of a general, even deadening uniformity. These canvases, ex-
ecuted mostly in the mountainous region of his native Franche-Comte´, often
feature (like the waterspout pictures) vertical elements—cliffs, thick forests,
and the like—that block the deep view and echo the upright orientation of
the picture.16 Courbet’s frequent practice of showing a winter scene adds
16. Both T. J. Clark and Anne M. Wagner have dismissed Courbet’s landscape paintings
owing to this lack of spatial recession and to what they each perceive as a resulting over-
emphasis on homogenizing technique. Clark writes:
Courbet’s landscapes very quickly become imprisoned within a formula. They are, typi-
cally, close-up views of a dense, continuous surface of rock and trees; for the most part a
surface which rises vertically, parallel to the picture plane. Recession into a far distance is
relatively rare, and where it appears it is perfunctorily handled. The sky is all but absent,
pushed above a high horizon line. . . . What is lacking . . . is Courbet’s urge to represent, in
his ‘earnest, empirical’ fashion, the particular surface and gravity of the things before him,
their individual nature as well as the matter they share. In the landscapes—and this in direct
and limiting contrast to the greatest figure paintings—individual shapes and surfaces and
weights tend to recede into the thick paste of paint. The palette knife takes over, the things
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the additional device of depicting snow, which bedecks the scenery much
as paint covers a canvas.17 In The Roe Deer’s Shelter in Winter from around
1866, the palette knife applies patches of white paint uniform in size, tone,
and texture to fore-, middle, and background alike, pulling the depths
toward the pictorial surface (fig. 5). Only strokes that depict the deer, the
dark recesses of a grotto to the left, and the tree branches above, which
occlude most of the deep view, offer alternate types of touch, many of them
brushed. This sort of winter forest scene would seem to offer the potential for
greater surface consistency and thematic regularity than the ocean views of
differentiated water, rock, and skies. Over the years, such uniformity in Cour-
bet’s late landscapes has opened itself to a variety of interpretations. Some
critics at the time, as well as a number of art historians since, have faulted the
works for what they take as a failure of nerve on Courbet’s part, especially in
comparison to the politically engaged genre scenes of the late 1840s, full of
stylistic tension. Zola rued in 1866, “Courbet, this year, has rounded the
rough corners of his genius and paints with a velvet touch. . . . This pow-
erful spirit [is] admired [by the unthinking crowd] just at the moment
when he has lost something of his power” (“C,” p. 310). Others have pos-
ited a facile metaphor between surface regularity and political structure to
suggest that Courbet’s landscapes express the spirit of democracy and
themselves are lost. Foliage and cliff-face blur into a froth of pigment, indefinite without
being in any effective sense ambiguous, since the paint is never precise enough to invite any
one reading, or even suggest finite alternatives.
(T. J. Clark, Image of the People: Gustave Courbet and the Second French Republic [London,
1973], pp. 132–33)
Wagner argues in a similar vein: “In most of these scenes, . . . penetration into the forest
interior is almost defeated by a dense screen of branches, rocks and foliage. Each part is treated
equally, drawn with the same generalizations, constructed with the same layered washes of
pigment.” Accordingly, specific subject matter ceases to matter: “The artist . . . placed his easel
at will, anywhere, and found truth without selecting it. . . . For critics, that direct, impartial
approach to a rather vague entity, nature, replaces and outweighs the importance and meaning
for his art of individual sites as real places” (Anne M. Wagner, “Courbet’s Landscapes and
Their Market,” Art History 4 [Dec. 1981]: 424, 423). I believe that this argument both overlooks
pronounced variation in Courbet’s painterly execution (and critical recognition of that variety)
and misinterprets the gist of Courbet’s representational gambit. To focus on nonrecessional
scenes is not to fail to select; it is rather to select scenes with a vertical character. To paint a
landscape with a loose manner that seemingly “reduce[s]” the prospect to effet (which Wagner
considers a means of making anodyne canvases palatable to a bourgeois audience averse to
content and conflict) is not to lose one’s grasp of the physical world but rather to search after
precisely those aspects of it that the painting can bring to the surface without relying on
deception.
17. Klaus Herding has commented on “the leveling effect of the blanket of snow” (Klaus
Herding, Courbet: To Venture Independence, trans. John William Gabriel [New Haven, Conn.,
1991], p. 81; hereafter abbreviated C).
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equality—as if artistic form and political form necessarily march in lock-
step to the same ideological drummer.18 Whether thus condemned or
championed, both approaches assume greater stylistic homogeneity dur-
ing the second part of Courbet’s career.
Yet finding only uniformity here may be reading not only the seascapes
but even the winter landscapes against the grain. Within The Roe Deer’s
Shelter in Winter, three deer materialize: shadows extending from the
grotto nearly swallow two of the group, but their plucky companion ven-
tures forth down a path between hillocks. It is certainly possible to see these
18. For instance, Linda Nochlin has written:
A reflection of the social ideals of 1848 could be seen in the very pictorial structure of
such a work as the Burial at Ornans. By its seemingly casual and fortuitous arrangement—
without beginning, middle or end—by its lack of selectivity and hence its implied rejection
of any accepted hierarchy of values, by its uniform richness of detail which tends to give an
equal emphasis to every element and thus produces, as it were, a pictorial democracy, a
compositional e´galitarisme, by its simplicity, awkwardness and lack of all Establishment
rhetoric, it could be seen as a paradigm for the quarante-huitard ideal itself. As exemplified
in such works, both Realism and Democracy were expressions of the same naı¨ve and stal-
wart confrontation of—and challenge to—the status quo. [Linda Nochlin, Realism (Har-
mondsworth, 1971), p. 48]
Herding has a more nuanced version of this argument, which I will discuss below.
F I G U R E 5 . Gustave Courbet, The Roe Deer’s Shelter in Winter (c. 1866). Oil on canvas, 54 72
cm. Lyon, Muse´e des Beaux-Arts. Photo: RMN-Grand Palais / Art Resource, NY.
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creatures as fully integrated parts of a harmonious natural whole. Lemon-
nier, for one, could write: “The accord between animal and landscape is
proof of Courbet’s good sense. . . . He rarely paints one without the other,
thus associating them as part of the same life; and, in fact, the animal is
nothing other than the incarnation of the energies of the earth” (GC, pp.
55–56). Haugeland might say that it makes no sense to distinguish deer
from surrounding ecosystem as separate components because the connec-
tions between them are too high-bandwidth; he borrows cognitive scien-
tist Herbert Simon’s example of an ant picking its way across the
irregularity of beach sand to illustrate such intimacy.19 This attitude toward
nature probably still rings true to many of today’s viewers of Courbet’s
landscapes, who might also be the sort to seek a rejuvenating walk through
the woods and could well regard the fauna they encounter as entirely as-
similated into the fabric of untouched nature. Certainly the two calm deer
to the left seem to meld into the wintry forest in this way; their dark tonal-
ities blend into the shadows, while the curled-up one could be mistaken for
a boulder.
However, the more daring beast at the center of the picture—starkly
juxtaposed against the white of the snow, back legs taut for flight, their
shape echoing in inverse the V of the hillocks—is another matter entirely.
So, too, is Courbet himself, who was no mere hiker, as his friend Castag-
nary attested: “A hunter as much as a painter, he more than once inter-
rupted a landscape study he had begun to seize a rifle and shoot at some
game passing by.”20 A hunter sets his sights on singularity, not on conti-
nuity; on differentiation, not integration. Confronted with the scene given
by The Roe Deer’s Shelter in Winter, his vision tunnels in on that healthy
buck (I will presuppose the sex, given the obvious implication of a family
group); all else would fade from view. Panoramic vision cedes to narrow
attentiveness. At this point, the stroll through the woods becomes a contest
of wills. “‘I have a quarry with which I can match my wits,’” declares the
master hunter General Zaroff in Richard Connell’s The Most Dangerous
Game of 1924.21 While Courbet does not stoop to Zaroff ’s evil extreme, we
still can sense in The Roe Deer’s Shelter in Winter the testing of competing
resolves, at the highest of stakes (at least for the deer) and with an uncertain
outcome. Will Courbet (the hunter now, not the painter) kill, or will the
19. See Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial (1969; Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp.
63–64; quoted in “MEE,” p. 209.
20. Castagnary, Exposition des œuvres de Gustave Courbet a` l’Ecole des Beaux-Arts (Mai 1882)
(Paris, 1882), p. 18.
21. Richard Connell, The Most Dangerous Game (1924; Rockville, Md., 2008), p. 23;
hereafter abbreviated MDG.
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buck escape? Those haunches, like tight springs, express the challenge:
“See if your trigger can outpace my leap!” Predator and pray face off, the
one against the other.
Face off? But that deer is retreating, its eyes out of sight. Not quite, for
while its head may turn away, its white rump and dark anus beneath an
upraised tail mimic a bigger, more intimidating oculus—like the owl’s eye
on a moth’s wing, or an oyster on the half shell, or the glint off a sardine
can.22 Much as a stroke of the brush stands out among the palette knife’s
patches, Courbet’s cervine target becomes a wrenching anomaly, a rent in
the otherwise constant screen of the landscape. What is more, the rent
reveals that beyond the screen lies something real that must remain invis-
ible on this surface; perhaps it is even a consciousness (at least that is the
effect of the oculus). The picture may generally lack spatial depth, but in
this manner it achieves ontological depth, psychological depth. Not quite
salience, then, but its spatial opposite: reentrance. The hunter encounters
something more than the hiker’s uniformly pleasant view (Courbet paints
more than an impression); his sight attempts to pierce into the scene, just
as his bullet will plunge into flesh.
Klaus Herding, who has produced the most intriguing account of Cour-
bet’s landscapes, comes closest to capturing the dual nature of these scenes.
Generally, Herding (in a manner easy to render congruent with Hauge-
land’s account of mind, body, and world) finds the late landscapes drift
toward “egalitarian structure” and “a search for unifying characteristics,
links, analogies” that make them “a representation of the equalizing effect
of nature and its suppression of individual objects” (C, pp. 89, 93).23 Not
only individual objects, including animals, blend into the natural setting;
the viewing subject also disperses in front of the scene. “Any fixation on a
single viewpoint (literally and figuratively) [Courbet] considered bour-
geois, a contradiction of the equality principle” (C, p. 78). Nonetheless—
and this is where Herding’s account achieves a complexity lacking in other
accounts that equate political and pictorial structure—“Wholesale and
abstract leveling, as Maxime Du Camp remarked, . . . might well create . . .
‘a fierce need for authority’ . . . in politics and art, and above all make
people long for the great man, the absolute ruler, the divine artist” (C, p.
63). Courbet’s surfaces, variegated both stylistically and thematically,
manifest a tension between uniformity and singularity, which could even
22. Like having to explain a joke, providing the citation here would ruin the reference.
23. As my description above of the variety of painting techniques used in The Waterspout,
Etretat might indicate, I would not share with Herding this blanket characterization of the late
works.
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take the form of a contrast between “a relatively near, isolated object” and
“a comprehensive overview” (C, p. 81).
For Herding, Courbet in many of his late landscapes “had replaced
[the] ‘great man’ with the authority of ‘the great outdoors’” itself before
dissolving even that singularity beneath the wash of homogenized tech-
nique, “scientific observation[,] and an intuitional feel for natural phe-
nomena” (C, pp. 93, 89). However, given the incessant interspersion of
game animals and natural setting in these pictures, a different interpreta-
tion might seem to press itself on us. Does not the hunter repeatedly step
onto these stages as a new authoritative protagonist, capable in his willful
confrontation with his prey to reestablish both the singularity of his target
and the spatial specificity of his point of view? Does not the hunter thus
distinguish himself as a separate component, looking upon and utilizing
the natural system rather than finding himself fully integrated into it?
Well, almost, except for one additional consideration. Hunters (and
other humans) may aspire for such omnipotence over those subject to
their will, but in their limited corporeal form they never actually attain
such transcendent powers.24 And even were they to do so (that is the sort of
impossibility that fiction can explore), they might well be disappointed. As
General Zaroff, that modern-day Nimrod, lamented about his situation
before he devised his story-worthy, homicidal solution: “Hunting was be-
ginning to bore me! . . . [It] had ceased to be what you call ‘a sporting
proposition.’ It had become too easy. I always got my quarry. Always.
There is no greater bore than perfection. . . . No animal had a chance with
me anymore. That is no boast; it is a mathematical certainty” (MDG, pp.
21–22). Without uncertainty, without the risk of failure, perhaps even
without the possibility of personal danger, hunting loses all interest. Who
still bothers to play tic-tac-toe? Once one masters the game, one ceases to
engage it and instead becomes a dispassionate analyst of its full disposition,
as if from above. Zaroff actually enacts this metaphysical leap from inside
participant to outside observer: “I was lying in my tent with a splitting
headache one night when a terrible thought pushed its way into my mind.
Hunting was beginning to bore me!” (MDG, p. 21).
So, Herding’s image of the “great man”—at least to the degree that it
carries with it the connotation of omniscience implicit in the phrase “di-
vine artist”—will not do as the alternative to a general leveling of the
landscape. We need, instead, some description that allows for irregularity
24. The tension between infinite divine omniscience and finite human vision, both
debilitating and enabling, is a theme repeatedly explored in my book, James D. Herbert, Our
Distance from God: Studies of the Divine and the Mundane in Western Art and Music (Berkeley,
2008).
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and the concentration of interest, but also resists the ascription of absolute
control. We might productively borrow the idea of emergence from the
science of complexity, an interdisciplinary line of thought that has devel-
oped over the past quarter century in academic domains ranging from
physics and computer science to biology and economics.25 (I will, in a
moment, relate this strain of thought to the arguments of Haugeland and
Dreyfus.) Emergence concerns the way in which the interactions of simple
behaviors at one level of a complex interactive system can prompt unpre-
dictable events at a higher level of the system that are qualitatively different
from, and irreducible to, anything that exists at the lower level. Imagine a
few relatively isotropic fields of chaotic material: the primordial soup, say,
or (at a grittier texture of chaos) a sylvan glade, or (still grittier) a devel-
oped market economy. Within such fields, certain nodes with a higher
degree of organization spontaneously emerge through the random inter-
action of many small elements (we don’t even need the fiction of conscious
actors realizing their intents): primitive life in the primordial soup; deer
and hunter in the landscape; a company with a new invention or new
econometric model in the market. These nodes have the characteristic of
striving after self-replication within their particular field. They can suc-
ceed, achieving growth; or they can fail, leading to extinction. Each node is
constantly reacting to its environment—both the background chaos and
other striving nodes—to adjust its tactics of self-replication. Biologists, for
instance, speak of an evolutionary arms race when predator and prey each
repeatedly adapt more sophisticated means of attack or defense in re-
sponse to changes in their adversary; economists describe a similar dy-
namic of improvement through competition. Social scientists might call
on game theory to account for such interactions, and (at the risk of a
misleading but unavoidable pun) we might well characterize the interac-
tion between hunter and deer as a game, with each actor using its wits to
anticipate and preempt the moves of the other. While behavior may be-
come more organized—the hunter becomes wilier or invents a more pow-
erful rifle; the deer evolves camouflage or learns to run away from men
bearing guns—no entity creates, plans, or fully comprehends the overall
25. I have drawn from a number of authors to develop a nontechnical understanding of
emergence: John H. Holland, Emergence: From Chaos to Order (Reading, Mass., 1998); Steven
Johnson, Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software (New York, 2001);
Stuart A. Kauffman, The Origins of Order (New York, 1993); Roger Lewin, Complexity: Life at
the Edge of Chaos (New York, 1992); Evolution and Emergence: Systems, Organisms, Persons, ed.
Nancy Murphy and William R. Stroeger (Oxford, 2007); and M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity:
The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (New York, 1992).
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disposition or knows its outcome. No one rises above the game to a posi-
tion of omniscience or omnipotence.
A few implications. First, a foray (an extended set of moves in the game)
cannot be fully planned out in advance. If a hunter just followed a preset
line on his map, failing to track the beast and alter his route according to
changes in circumstance, only the most improbable of chances would ever
get him near enough to his prey to let him get off a shot. This dynamic
should sound familiar; it resembles the behavior of the expert in Dreyfus’s
and Haugeland’s accounts. As the Dreyfus brothers quote phenomenolo-
gist Aron Gurwitch: “What is imposed on us to do . . . is not determined by
us as someone standing outside the situation simply looking on at it; what
occurs and is imposed are rather prescribed by the situation and its own
structure itself; and we do more and greater justice to it the more we let
ourselves be guided by it, i.e., the less reserved we are in immersing our-
selves in it and subordinating ourselves to it.”26 (I would quibble with
Gurwitch only by pointing out that the “situation” can no more “pre-
scribe” than can the agent.)
Second, the events of a particular hunt are in no sense predetermined;
rather, they emerge from the interaction of its constituent parts in unpre-
dictable ways. This is not a epistemic limitation; it is an ontological fact.
Even a massive (or divine) mind aware of the position and trajectory of
every molecule making up hunter, deer, and forest at the initial moment of
the hunt could not anticipate the emergent patterns of higher organization
that spontaneously self-generate to influence the outcome of the contest: a
human or cervine tactic, say; a gust of wind; or the formation of obscuring
fog. Part of the attraction of the hunt, in fact, is that ultimately it does
manage to pull a starkly definite outcome out of a wildly indefinite context.
Third, actors, namely the hunter and the deer, have reappeared on the
stage—though we need to be quite precise about what constitutes such
agents. On one hand, we already have a description of the workings of the
expert that would argue against any differentiation of such planning sub-
jects over and against the contexts of body and environment in which they
operate. Thus we know better than to regard the thoughts of hunter and
deer as somehow belonging to autonomous beings implementing their
intents but, instead, can consider this sort of human or cervine conscious
mental activity as themselves emergent resources that serve the purpose of
refining the tactics of pursuit and evasion within the actual situation of the
26. Aron Gurwitsch, Human Encounters in the Social World (Pittsburgh, 1979), p. 67;
quoted in Dreyfus and Dreyfus, “The Challenge of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of
Embodiment for Cognitive Science,” p. 111.
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hunt. On the other hand, the process of emergence does indeed have the
capacity to generate entities at a higher level of complexity, including sub-
jects, that are more than the sum of their parts. The best example comes
from the insect world: Individual ants each follow a remarkably rudimen-
tary set of programmed instructions—“if you encounter pheromone X,
then do Y”—and yet the mutual encounters of thousands of them give rise
to colonies whose divisions of labor, methods of daily provisioning, and
even architecture can manifest extraordinary complexity, complexity that
never could have been discerned from an examination of the simple pher-
omonal code at the level of individual creature. Analogically, individual
neurons behave very simply—“if you are stimulated, fire!”—yet the ani-
mated intertwining of billions of them give rise to a complexity and coher-
ency of mind—of hunter and of deer—that remain irreducible to
properties of the constituent neurons. Out there in the world, you can’t
pull out your scalpel and cut mind away from neural network; mind and
neural network are roughly two names for much the same territory, viewed
at two different levels of emergence where different, indeed irreconcilable,
characteristics become apparent. Thus the subjects hunter and deer as pre-
sented thematically in Courbet’s picture need not be taken by us as affir-
mations of the idea of autonomous agents, for each can better be regarded
as complex nodes at a higher level, emerging out of myriad interactions
among thought processes, body parts, and various aspects of the sur-
rounding forest, all of which are depicted, implied, or presupposed in this
fictive world. (The Courbet who deliberated over this theme was certainly
oblivious to the concept of emergence, but he would have understood fully
well the contingent nature of the hunt and the interdependence of its
participants.)
Thematically, then, the tension in The Roe Deer’s Shelter in Winter and
in Courbet’s other late hunting scenes is not between a uniform landscape
and Herding’s figure of absolute authority. It is between a chaotic field of
nature and certain nodes of higher organization emerging out of that field
and thus disrupting its relative regularity. It has the dynamic of a game—
not just player against player (hunter against deer) but also moves played
out against the game board (the activities of stalking and flight within the
sylvan setting). These tensions, as recorded in a painting capturing a mo-
ment at mid-hunt, never reach resolution. We cannot rise to the omni-
scient position where the outcome of the chase can be known both because
we, as humans viewing the scene from the perspective of the hunter, are
always caught within the game and because the game itself is still evolving
according to the unpredictable interactions of its elements, actors and
setting alike, and thus lacks predetermination.
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The dynamic pertains even in unpopulated paintings, such as The Wa-
terspout, Etretat. Just as the venturesome deer presents itself in the forest
scene as an anomalous node, so too certain parts of the seascape, such as
the bright patch of foam at the center, insist on making a splash. In this
case, the spray does burst forward as salient, but with a posited real wave,
as it were, reentrant behind it. The waves depicted to the left in the paint-
ing, which are also featured in many of Courbet’s other images of the
ocean, are, in fact, prime examples from nature of self-generating systems
of higher organization emerging out of the relatively uniform chaos of
background turbulence. The central crash of water is then the story (be-
longing to the genre of tragedy) of such a system’s demise as it encounters
its enduring adversary, the rock, and returns to general disorder. We, the
witnesses on the beach, share with the hunter an incapacity to foresee any
exact outcomes: the trajectory of each bit of spray, for instance, or the
timing of the next shower tossed up, or when the rock will ultimately cede,
as it surely must, to one wave too many. Divine omniscience is no more
available in The Waterspout, Etretat than it is in The Roe Deer’s Shelter in
Winter. Both pictures formulate worlds in which dramas, unscripted and
unpredictable, emerge to disrupt the regularity of the field.
To be sure, The Waterspout, Etretat and The Roe Deer’s Shelter in Winter
present more than just thematic expositions to the eyes of hunter and
beachcomber. They, and Courbet’s other late landscapes, also offer them-
selves up as painted surfaces, executed by an artist and viewed by an aes-
thetically inclined audience. So perhaps the “great man,” the “divine
artist,” has retreated to the redoubt of style where Courbet’s loose and
varied manner of painting, seemingly the product of his artistic intent,
would appear authoritatively to expresses his individual sensibility in re-
sponse to a place. Thus the great myth of modern French painting, so well
personified in Courbet, that the brushstroke expresses the authentic and
autonomous self. The artist’s devotion to direct perception of nature and
to sincere expression of it, far from constraining stylistic autonomy, could
even seem to enhance it greatly because these independent commitments
liberated him from the petty professional constraints of the Acade´mie and
E´cole. As Lemonnier contended:
[Courbet’s] temperament is of a whole piece. [He] receives an im-
pression of objects and expresses them as he senses them, without
being distracted by goals foreign to his [own] task as a painter. [GC,
p. 16]
He found his path, and he marched down it with the obstinacy of a
man who is sure of having his destiny in front of him. [GC, p. 25]
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He had the audacity to be himself, with the subaltern sides of his
temperament, without attempting to see beyond that. [GC, p. 66]
By this account, Courbet was no player engaged in a game with others.
Members of the academy, juries of the salon, could get caught up in such
social machinations—which Lemonnier would characterize as a milieu “of
lies and bad faith, [of the] shabbiness of little souls” (GC, p. 19).27 Courbet’s
idiosyncratic brushstrokes, in contrast, declare him master of himself and
master of his art.
Nonetheless, no matter how persistent this hoary myth may prove and
however wide the breadth of the subscription to it, it simply cannot stand
before scrutiny as an adequate account of painting—Courbet’s or anyone
else’s.28 Painting does not cede itself thus to mastery; its complex character
precludes any omniscient stance outside of engaged practice. Haugeland
and Dreyfus have already set out the reasons why this is so. There is no
Courbet, and especially no Courbet the expert painter, posed outside the
realm of the brushstrokes on canvas; the creative process connects mind
and body and paint and canvas with all too much intimacy to allow for that
sort of distance and differentiation. We can now enhance this analysis by
recognizing the dynamics of emergence operating across this field of
highly interactive elements. In this creative process, as in the primordial
soup and in the sylvan setting and with the market, nodes with a higher
degree of organization arise. Like deer and Microsoft, these nodes assume
names: Courbet and The Roe Deer’s Shelter in Winter. Like the collections
27. The passage actually refers to the petty types Delacroix earlier encountered, but there is
no doubt that the critic would have believed that little had changed among the bureaucrats of
artistic mediocrity during the intervening years.
28. Serving as an example of the longevity of this modernist myth, curator Mary Morten
has recently written:
A comprehensive look at his contribution to the genre of landscape . . . reveals a radically
innovative practice in Courbet’s choice of motifs and his compositions, use of color, and
paint application. His landscapes initiated a vital current of Modernist painting, shifting the
focus of ambitious painting away from narrative description—whether historical, mythological,
poetic, religious, or political—to self-expression, with nature providing both a subject and a less
regulated arena in which the artist could enact an original performance-in-paint. Through
Courbet’s work, the experience of viewing painting became less that of reading and interpret-
ing a codified language of represented figural gestures than of witnessing the artist’s expres-
sive manipulation of paint on a two-dimensional surface. Courbet’s landscapes broke from
the rhetorical tradition of reference and emulation—the backbone of French painting for
two hundred years—to a practice ardently devoted to fresh vision, unmediated perception,
and the direct expression of emotion, central tenets of avant-garde painting for the next
hundred years.
(Marty Morton, “To Create a Living Art: Rethinking Courbet’s Landscape Painting,” in Courbet
and the Modern Landscape, ed. Mary Morton and Charlotte Eyerman [exhibition catalog, J.
Paul Getty Museum, Los Angeles, 21 Feb.–14 May 2006], p. 2)
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of amino acids in the primordial soup, these emergent entities show dis-
tinct signs of life; obviously Courbet grows and acts on the world, but the
painting also seems to take on a life of its own. The expert movements of
the brush and knife quickly establish their own rhythm, their own flow,
and soon the placement of paint feels beyond the conscious control of the
artist. Novelists sense the same thing when the characters they invent seem
to demand that their actions and emotions pursue a certain trajectory;
scholars can feel the same way about the arguments they formulate. Jazz
improvisers sense that they must follow a musical line as they play rather
than deciding on it ahead of time and then leading their instrument
through the paces during performance. Courbet did not declare “let the
waters under the sky be gathered together” and “let the earth bring forth
living creatures of every kind” and then command his canvases to realize
his immutable and exhaustive initial intents (Gen. 1:9, 1:24). He set out
upon the project, then constantly adjusted as its demands upon him
shifted and evolved. Eventually, The Roe Deer’s Shelter in Winter just went
where it had to go; it emerged, as did Courbet the creative artist, from the
process in ways entirely unpredictable given initial conditions. At a lower
level, a multitude of daubs on brush tip and on canvas flit or budge, mix in
or cover over, in rapid response to the colors and textures—the artistic
equivalent of pheromones—of their mates closest at hand. (Science writer
Steven Johnson argues: “Local turns out to be the key term in understand-
ing the power of swarm logic. We see emergent behavior in systems like ant
colonies when the individual agents in the system pay attention to their
immediate neighbors rather than wait for orders from above. They think
locally and act locally, but their collective action produces global behav-
ior.”)29 Simultaneously at a higher level, painter and painting acted on each
other like two bucks butting heads in the wood—or in Courbet’s enor-
mous Spring Rut, the Battle of the Stags of 1861. At times, Courbet caused
The Roe Deer’s Shelter in Winter to proceed in a certain way, but at other
times The Roe Deer’s Shelter in Winter caused Courbet to paint in a certain
manner. Along these lines, Dreyfus has written: “Our actions bring the
world into line with what we would want if we thought about it, [but] the
experience of acting has a world-to-mind direction of causation. We don’t
experience ourselves as causing the action; the situation draws the action
out of us.”30
29. Johnson, Emergence, p. 74.
30. Hubert L. Dreyfus, “Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Husserl’s (and Searle’s) Concept of
Intentionality,” Rereading Merleau-Ponty: Essays beyond the Continental-Analytic Divide, ed.
Lawrence Hass and Dorothea Olkowski (Amherst, N.Y., 2000), p. 42. As a favorite example on
this point, Dreyfus quotes basketball great Larry Bird: “[A lot of the] things I do on the court
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Crucially, none of this serves to distinguish Courbet or the picture, as
they act upon each other, as components (in Haugeland’s sense of the
word) separable from the full artistic process. It is not as if we can, at points
of low-bandwidth interface, carve Courbet and The Roe Deer’s Shelter in
Winter off as agent and product (input and output), leaving the essence of
the creative operation intact inbetween. Painter and painting are that op-
eration. These terms all name basically the same thing, but seen at different
levels, higher or lower, of emergence. There is no colony without the ants
and no ants without a colony (a monad is the walking dead), yet when we
look at ants and colony we see different characteristics, characteristics such
as “sniffing the danger pheromone” and “covering half an acre” that re-
main fundamentally irreducible, indeed incomparable, to each other. If
you’re viewing at the level of one, you can’t see the other, and it makes no
sense to imagine a unified formicine entity that simultaneously sniffs dan-
ger and occupies territory. Likewise, while we can differentiate painter
from individual canvas both at a higher level of emergence (like hunter and
deer), it would be meaningless to distinguish Courbet from, and then
compare him to or conflate him with, the vast collection of minute brush-
strokes (and neurons, and so forth) that make up the lower-level interac-
tive field of artistic creation. Courbet the emergent subject and Courbet the
label we attach to an artistic process are incommensurate entities—even
as, in a different sense, they always remain the same thing. In this case,
however, unlike with ants and colony, it proves quite easy to use the same
name for these dissimilar manifestations at two different levels. Indeed,
that is precisely how the great nineteenth-century myth of the brushstroke
does its work. Courbet is both an artistic process (the complex, unpredict-
able interaction of myriad parts) and a man (autonomous, the master of
his art). The resulting critical amalgam, Courbet the artist fully embedded
in his natal land and class yet a master willful and independent, is as devoid
of actual substantive content as is the entomological entity that supposedly
both sniffs and spreads. This image of the artist may be lacking in meaning
or coherence, yet it also has proven wildly useful as an ideological con-
struct, for it allows the miraculous production of an otherwise impossible
sort of powerful agent, autochthonous and autonomous at one and the
same moment. Sometimes, ideology consists simply in the successful sus-
pension of a contradiction as a truth.31
are just reactions to situations. A lot of times, I’ve passed the basketball and not realized I’ve
passed it until a moment or so later” (p. 45).
31. I expand on this idea, using the tension between individual and collective inherent in
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If the great nineteenth-century myth magically renders subject and pro-
cess commensurate across the divide of their different levels of emergence,
the critical account of Courbet as an exemplar of realism similarly strives
to efface any incompatibility between painted surface and nature. We have
witnessed the conceit, much aided by Courbet’s own thematic choices and
technical practices, that abstracts out of nature and treats as its essence
only those aspects of it that maintain material identity with the paints
themselves: lime and sand, vertical surfaces, and all that. By these lights,
The Roe Deer’s Shelter in Winter, like The Waterspout, Etretat, reverses the
usual direction of representation, in this case by discovering in the dynam-
ics of the hunt something that resembles the dynamics of art. But surely the
vast and complex networks of the natural world generate countless emer-
gent entities that remain fundamentally incommensurate with both the
pedestrian processes of painting and with their own natural lower-level
material substrate with which Courbet’s thick oils might hope to establish
a match. Those instances of nature that give rise to the feeling of the sub-
lime are the most obvious example, but any part of nature that exceeds
culture will serve. Courbet’s works would have none of such stuff, would
rather pretend that nature of the sort that might escape its grasp simply did
not exist. Even when they are large and ambitious, these canvases eschew
the sublime (a telling omission); the world they present is always familiar,
always closed in, always close to home. Zola, you may recall, claimed the
artist “had the raw desire to clutch real nature in his arms,” as if it could all
be held in his personal embrace; the critic’s lapidary definition had art
attempt but a “corner of creation seen through a temperament,” a means to
keep nature’s expanse within human bounds (“C,” pp. 312, 307). Of course,
everyone at the time and since, including Zola and Courbet himself, has
known full well that this contained version of nature is more wish than
reality. The pleasure of viewing realist pictures always consists in equal
measure of letting oneself be drawn in by the fiction of representational
adequacy and of exercising the wisdom to recognize the difference
between art and world.32 In contrast, during an era when the great
nineteenth-century myth was operating at full force, the idea that the
brushstroke could fully represent the artist was probably something that
really could be believed—or, at least, it did not immediately call for its
the phrase “It’s my flag,” in Herbert, “Visual Culture / Visual Studies,” in Critical Terms for Art
History, ed. Robert S. Nelson and Richard Shiff (Chicago, 2003), pp. 452–64.
32. Ce´cile Whiting explores this idea in Ce´cile Whiting, “Trompe l’œil Painting and the
Counterfeit Civil War,” Art Bulletin 79 (June 1997): 251–68.
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opposite, the recognition of the brushstroke’s biographical inadequacies.
In essence, Courbet’s pictures (together with their critical reception) make
their claim to realism by attempting to reflect the accepted representa-
tional adequacy of the brushstroke’s gesture toward the self in the op-
posite direction, as it were, along a less secure trajectory toward the
subject matter of nature. We begin to discern the true dynamics of both
theme and painterly style in these landscape pictures only when we,
contrary to critical protocols for the establishment of coherence and
unity, allow both “Courbet” and “nature” to disperse into incommen-
surate, multilevel multiplicity.
Earlier, I pointed out that it has been argued, both in the artist’s day and
in subsequent scholarship, that Courbet’s later landscapes constitute a
failure of nerve, a retreat from his earlier, often more politically engaged
paintings. The argument would seem to presume that Courbet, fortified
with the hubris of youth and deeply imbedded in a revolutionary situation
with its promise of social change, felt able during the earlier phase of his
career to do more than simply go hunting for moments within painting
where he could rhyme self, surface, and subject matter. Rather, he seemed
capable of formulating an authoritative stance for himself and then of
imposing his will on his works. Perhaps, then, these earlier works offer an
escape from the dynamic of emergence from below because they constitute
a forceful reassertion of artistic sovereignty from above. Perhaps the great
nineteenth-century myth can survive into our own day through means of
these stronger (better, more important, more political, more willful, what-
ever) early pictures by Courbet.
In no instance, perhaps, is this presupposition of youthful artistic au-
thority more formidable than with Courbet’s masterwork of 1854–55, The
Painter’s Studio: A Real Allegory Summing up Seven Years of My Artistic Life
(fig. 6). In size alone, The Painter’s Studio is clearly an ambitious painting.
With an acreage over twenty-five times greater than The Waterspout,
Etretat and The Roe Deer’s Shelter in Winter combined, it aspires to the
scale of history painting where the smaller works would seem to settle for
mantelpiece decoration. And as a history painting—or as its institutional
antithesis, an antihistory painting—it would appear intent on making an
important point. The first part of the subtitle given by the artist, A Real
Allegory, reinforces the sense that this monumental canvas must have some
big meaning lying deep within the allegorical realm, beyond whatever as-
pects of the real it depicts on its surface; whereas the last part of that
subtitle, My Artistic Life, provides a seemingly unified entity, one fully
congruent with the great nineteenth-century myth, around which that big
meaning can cohere. The Burial at Ornans of 1849–50 and the other major
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works of its era may have been more fiercely embedded in a revolutionary
moment, but they lack the insistence of The Painter’s Studio on such alle-
gorical depth.33 Artist, painting, and subject matter would seem to come
together in allegorized unity somewhere beyond the immediate presence
of what the picture overtly shows. The sharp conceptual divide between
reality and allegory allows this interpretative trope whereby the multiple
converges into one. Courbet himself, both author and object of the alle-
gory, would seem the sole coherent custodian of any such concealed sin-
gular meaning, which he appears to have chosen to withhold from his
viewers. “You’ll have to understand it as best you can,” the artist declared
to his close friend the novelist and critic Champfleury (Jules Franc¸ois Felix
Fleury-Husson), in a letter sent from Ornans in late 1854 that thoroughly
describes the individual parts of the painting without declaring its unifying
thesis: “The people who want to judge will have their work cut out for
them, they will manage as best they can.”34
Ever since, commentators on the painting have been doing exactly that.
Assuming that a coherent and unitary Courbet began with a specific alle-
gorical meaning in his conscious mind before expressing it on canvas,
perspicacious viewers have then attempted to pierce through material
traces left by the artist to bring that concealed meaning forward to the light
of day. The Painter’s Studio has become one of the great “problem” paint-
ings in art history (alongside such works as Diego Vela´zquez’s Las Meninas
of 1656 and E´douard Manet’s Bar of the Folies-Berge`re of 1882) because it
allows scholars to become hermeneutic hunters out to bag the big buck of
Courbet’s allegorical intent that lies hidden somewhere within the forest
of his realist project.35 Laurence des Cars summarizes the resulting herd of
competing arguments: “For He´le`ne Toussaint, it represents a Masonic
lodge; for Linda Nochlin, a Fourierist metaphor; for Klaus Herding, a
lesson in power directed at Napoleon III; for James Rubin, a work influ-
enced by Proudhon. With its use of allegory, The Painter’s Studio demands
interpretation. . . . [It] exists on many levels, never entirely yielding up its
secrets.”36 Even as interpretations multiply, the actual intent of Courbet
33. Clark, Image of the People, remains the strongest study of Courbet during this
revolutionary period.
34. Gustave Courbet, letter to Champfleury, [Nov.–Dec. 1854], The Letters of Gustave Courbet,
trans. and ed. Petra ten-Doesschate Chu (Chicago, 1992), p. 132; hereafter abbreviated “L.”
35. Michael Fried names The Painter’s Studio as “one of the three supreme representations
of representation in all Western art,” alongside Vela´zquez’s Las Meninas and Vermeer’s Artist in
His Studio of around 1666 (Michael Fried, Courbet’s Realism [Chicago, 1990], p. 155).
36. Laurence des Cars, “The Painter’s Studio: A Real Allegory Summing up a Seven-Year
Phase of My Artistic Life,” in Gustave Courbet, ed. des Cars et al. (exhibition catalog,
Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, 27 Feb.–18 May 2008), p. 224. The list is not
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remains an ever-elusive prey. The question that Herding asks, “On
what conceptual level does this visually so heterogeneous triptych-like
composition coalesce?” voices the mandate that keeps all scholars seek-
ing (C, p. 51).
Yet, what if there is no such conceptual coalescence? What if there is no
authoritative intent lying in the depths beyond the surface, unifying into a
coherent whole the many parts of this fragmented picture? What if the
game continues not because its prey of coalescing concept or authorial
intent is elusive but because it never existed (sasquatch or heffalump, not
roe deer)? What if, in short, The Painter’s Studio, rather than standing as
the meaningful alternative to the seemingly meaningless later landscapes,
instead shares with them a deep-seated incommensurability and a dy-
namic of emergence out of multiplicity?
In one of those keen observations that makes him such a delight to read,
Michael Fried points out certain parallels, “unmistakable as soon as dis-
cerned,” between the general configuration of the landscape painting on
the easel in front of the self-portrait of Courbet at the center of The Paint-
er’s Studio and the posture of the nude model directly behind him: her
head and neck cocked in the manner of the portrayed trees, drapery flow-
ing like the waters of the river depicted just above the painter’s lowered left
knee.37 What Fried does not remark upon, owing to his exclusive focus on
the central group, is that the painting-within-a-painting also echoes the
structure of the overall canvas. Just as the tree’s foliage forms a dark mass
imposing on the landscape from the upper right, so too a shadowy cloud of
drapery, which lacks visible support, hangs over the right side of The Painter’s
Studio. Just as a sky and variegated horizon appear in the landscape on the
easel, clouds and sky above a line of silhouetted trees and hills provide a back-
drop to the full work. In a couple of letters from late 1854, Courbet stated that
he had shown on the back wall of his depicted studio the paintings The Peas-
ants of Flagey Returning from the Fair of 1850–55 and The Bathers of 1853.38 The
exhaustive, most notably excluding the famous reading by Michael Fried, which has The
Painter’s Studio serve as an allegory of painting itself. Fried’s argument appears in its most
accessible form in Courbet’s Realism but is nicely summarized in the short abstract appearing at
the top of the earlier published version of the argument: “The central group in Courbet’s
‘Studio’ is emblematic of a desire to reduce to an absolute minimum all sense of distance and
difference between painting and beholder, the first beholder being the painter himself”
(anonymous, abstract for Fried, “Representing Representation: On the Central Group in
Courbet’s ‘Studio,’” Art in America 69 [Sept. 1981]: 127).
37. Fried, Courbet’s Realism, p. 162.
38. See Courbet, letter to Alfred Bruyas, [Nov.–Dec. 1854], The Letters of Gustave Courbet,
p. 129, and “L,” p. 131.
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surviving landscape in the background of The Painter’s Studio was once the
picture of peasants (there is no trace of the bathers), but is no longer; rustic
heads and baskets have been rounded off to efface the trace of humans, the
area of light sky has been greatly expanded in three directions beyond the
dimensions of the original work, and no sign of a frame remains. In fact,
this landscape bears no remaining resemblance to the framed picture di-
rectly behind central easel and model (not The Bathers, which shows no
sky), nor to the framed canvas placed face to the wall near the left edge. It
no longer appears to be a depicted picture at all, for it is not fictively
parallel to the background wall of the depicted studio but rather is flush,
even selfsame, with the surface of The Painter’s Studio itself. The series of
translucent bands cutting vertically across the background landscape as
well as the set of rectilinear articulations that break it and the studio wall
into sections further right would appear to contain this work only within
the segments of actual canvas that were conjoined in order to make a surface
sufficiently large to render The Painter’s Studio.39 Perhaps Courbet even once
painted out this natural setting, and it is only visible now (like the leftmost
basket in The Peasants of Flagey; like the woman accompanying Charles
Baudelaire at the far right of The Painter’s Studio) owing to the fact that the
covering layer has become semi-transparent over time. Once the landscape
thus expands (tentatively, ambiguously) across the background, the me-
dallion hanging on the back wall comes to serve double duty as a celestial
orb rising above the natural scene, the woman it portrays becoming like a
man in the moon. Overall, it is as if Courbet’s cosmopolitan studio stirs
itself from sleep to remember, in only half awareness, that it once was really
the countryside of Courbet’s native Franche-Comte´.
An aging Euge`ne Delacroix, who generally approved of the canvas, re-
marked upon seeing The Painter’s Studio in 1855: “The only fault is that the
picture he is painting creates an ambiguity: it seems to be a real sky in the
middle of the picture.”40 But that might be precisely the idea. This depicted
studio appears too lofty for a normal interior space.41 The horizontal line
39. A summary of the construction of the canvas support of The Painter’s Studio from
seven sections of cloth appears in Lola Faillant-Dumas, “Examination by the Laboratoire de
Recherche des Muse´es de France,” in Gustave Courbet, 1819–1877 (exhibition catalog, Galeries
Nationales d’Exposition du Grand Palais, Paris, 1 Oct. 1977–2 Jan. 1978), p. 283.
40. Euge`ne Delacroix, Journal de Euge`ne Delacroix, ed. Paul Flat and Rene´ Piot, 3 vols.
(Paris, 1895), 3:64.
41. Although the painting was executed entirely in Ornans, Courbet states in the letter to
Champfleury that he is depicting his studio in Paris; see “L,” p. 131. Benedict Nicolson describes
this space, located at 32 rue Hautefeuille but demolished in 1878, as a converted priory, with the
erstwhile chapel serving as Courbet’s studio. See Benedict Nicolson, Courbet: The Studio of the
Painter (London, 1973), pp. 22–23. The painting itself provides little architectural detail to aid in
the identification.
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that appears seven-tenths of the way up the canvas, visibly a seam mark
between conjoined sections of canvas that is inadequately painted over,
might appear properly placed to function as the demarcation of the top of
the back wall, but it absolutely fails to fold that wall forward to define a
ceiling. (Similarly, it is unclear along which of three possible vertical lines
the side wall to the right bends into the back wall.) Nearly one third of the
picture lies above this long horizontal line, but the expanse is virtually
ignored in the literature on the painting. What is this upper section for,
except to suggest that the painter’s studio opens upward like the great
outdoors? The depicted sky in the painting is like the sky on the back-
ground wall, which is like the real sky. Even within this interior, we join
Courbet the hunter on his stalk through the woods.
And what herd of creatures ventures out into clearing within this
pseudo-sylvan setting? Let us pull out our field manuals (Courbet’s letters,
the accumulated discoveries of scholarship) and identify the species and
their members. To the left, according to his letter to Champfleury, Courbet
assembled a collection of types personifying “society at its highest, its low-
est, and its average”: figures include “a Jew whom I saw in England,” “a
priest,” “an old Republican of ’93,” “a hunter,” “a fancy-clothes mer-
chant,” and “an Irish woman nursing a child” (“L,” pp. 131–32). In 1977,
He´le`ne Toussaint complicated the matter by noticing an extraordinary set
of resemblances: many of the types to the left bear the recognizable phys-
iognomies of prominent political figures. The Jew looks like financier and
statesman Achilles Fould; the Republican of ’93 has the face of Minister of
the Interior Lazare Carnot; and, most tellingly, the man with a cap accom-
panied by dogs (unmentioned in the letter to Champfleury) resembles
Emperor Napoleon III.42 Toussaint’s unveiling of the dissimulated por-
traits has struck most experts as instantly compelling, but we need to con-
sider why. It isn’t because the curator laid her hands on the magic key that
deciphers the true hidden meaning of Courbet’s huge canvas. As it pro-
ceeds, Toussaint’s list of personalities takes on a Borgesian flavor—the
likes of “China” and “Russian socialism, represented by Herzen” join the
cast—and the curator’s own proposal for a master explanatory device,
Freemasonry (that venerable hidden conspiracy, always on call as hidden
cause), does not even attempt to account for the various members of this
motley crew.43 Rather, the curator’s identifications satisfy because their
form, not their specific content, activates a hermeneutic plunge into depth.
42. See He´le`ne Toussaint, “The Dossier on ‘The Studio’ by Courbet,” in Gustave Courbet,
1819–1877, pp. 260–66.
43. Ibid., p. 261.
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Like the oculus of the deer’s hindquarters, each face promises a real sub-
jectivity with which the artist or viewer could potentially match wits. Each
personality rents the representational screen of this picture with the deep
puncture of a real being existing elsewhere, beyond the visibility of the
social stereotypes presented on this painted surface.
Over on the right side, in contrast, the individual personalities tend not
to hide their identities, and Courbet’s letter to Champfleury gives their
names. Many are childhood friends (and thus also natives to Franche-
Comte´) or at least acquaintances of the artist.44 Closest to the edge, Baude-
laire reads a book, while the ghostly image of his mistress, painted out at
the poet’s request, has resurfaced over time to look over her shoulder back
at him. The next two couples further left, often referred to as the art col-
lectors and the lovers, are not identified in the letter (though scholars,
again, have leapt at the opportunity to hunt). Champfleury himself sits a
bit further to the left, accompanied by a prone young boy on the floor
below him, sketching. Behind the novelist in a circle of three stand, right to
left, journalist and Charles Fourier sympathizer Max Buchon, hunting
companion Urbain Cuenot, and leftist political philosopher Pierre-Joseph
Proudhon (about whom more later). Finally, farthest left, collector Alfred
Bruyas and violinist Alphonse Promayet, with fiddle in hand, fill out the
group. Whereas the social types at the left side of the canvas dissimulate
individual identities, at the right side individual identities hint at social
types; the friends embody different forms of writing—journalism, prose,
and poetry—or of the arts—music, drawing, and . . . painting. Painting
also? Yes, for the central figure of Courbet not only portrays himself but
also, brush in hand and canvas before him, personifies his activity. The
nude model positioned between the painter and the other men of letters
and arts exemplifies the resulting double direction of signification within
this real allegory, leftward and rightward; either behind the muse lurks the
real individual of the hired model (here nameless but undoubtedly name-
able at the time), or behind the individual model lies the allegory of the
muse (suggested but not made fully manifest on the surface). In either
direction, the picture has rents, psychological or semiotic breaches that
appear wherever a visible and present body stands in for a person or type
absent but evoked.
Once all these holes of representational depth populate The Painter’s
Studio, the sheer proliferation of points of reentrance—both allegories to
decipher and real wits with which to match one’s own—might strike a
viewer as disturbingly unorganized, without a guiding structure. This
44. Biographies of the individuals appear in Nicolson, Courbet, pp. 40–60.
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would seem to be the reaction of Quillenbois, whose compositionally con-
servative caricature strives to reduce the number of major characters in
The Painter’s Studio to a manageable number (fig. 7). Quillenbois’s dispo-
sition of figures, with a painter henpecked by his model as primary vi-
gnette, a hirsute Champfleury and cigarette-smoking bohemienne to the
right of secondary importance, and capped man and viewing child to the
left in tertiary rank, wants to order and prioritize actors in a manner rem-
iniscent of academic history painting. But Courbet’s painting itself does no
such thing. With only a minor diminution of some figures to comply with
the weak demands of spatial recession in a shallow room, everyone por-
trayed here is of the same magnitude in size; the picture is close to a frieze.
The model and, to a lesser extent, the central Courbet receive a bit more
highlighting than the rest (the caricature picks up on that lesser extent and
accordingly lets the woman dominate over the artist), but bared flesh ac-
counts for most of that differential treatment, and otherwise no one across the
full canvas benefits much from emphasis conferred by either hue or tone. No
bright blues or reds, for instance, designate the principal personae in the tra-
ditional manner.
In a typical academic history painting, either the artist who makes the
painting (Charles Le Brun, say, or Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres) or the
F I G U R E 7 . Quillenbois [Charles-Marie de Sarcus], “M. Courbet in All the Glory of His Own
Individuality. . . ,” L’Illustration, 21 July 1855. Reproduced in Courbet selon les caricatures et les
images, ed. Charles Le´ger (Paris, 1920), p. 28.
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hero of the featured action (Alexander or Homer) can bear responsibility for
bestowing order—aesthetic or political; that’s the active metaphor—on the
depicted scene. In The Painter’s Studio, neither such subject, who both
happen to be Courbet, deliver. The real Courbet, creator of this enormous
canvas, punctuates the bottom half of this mostly flat field with relatively
commensurate and evenly distributed representational rents while neither
relating the three major groups to one another nor providing composi-
tional guidance within any one of them (except, weakly, the middle clus-
ter). He doesn’t even give us the consistency of isotropic space to unite the
field; the handful of orthogonals along the right edge point in disparate
directions, never providing the orientation of a single vanishing point.
Champfleury grasped the essence when he quipped, “The Painter’s Stu-
dio . . . is not one painting, but ten paintings.”45 Meanwhile, the de-
picted Courbet is so caught up in his relatively small landscape that he
ignores the rest of the world crowding into his studio. Herding would
have this Courbet perpetuating a tradition of pictures showing artist
meeting political leader within the studio, thereby casting The Painter’s
Studio as “an adhortatio ad principem, an exhortation to the ruler” (C,
p. 57). But this hardly seems right; the man with dogs, even if he is
recognized as Napoleon III, and the central painter remain oblivious to
each other’s presence. This depicted Courbet, no more than the author
of the full work, gives no indication of striving to exert controlling or
unifying force over the large canvas’s field of representation. No “great
man,” no “divine artist” poses or paints here.46
Or, for that matter, no “great man” looks on. With academic painting,
the political leader commissioning the work (Le Brun’s Louis XIV, say, or
Ingres’s Charles X) could also be regarded, sometimes even by analogy
between ruler and depicted hero, as the authority insuring coherence and
order, imposing it on the world from his position of omnipotent transcen-
45. Jules Franc¸ois Felix Fleury-Husson Champfleury, Grandes Figures d’hier et
d’aujourd’hui: Balzac, Ge´rard de Nerval, Wagner, Courbet (Paris, 1861), p. 258.
46. Although Herding claims that Courbet’s exhortation exhibits “concreteness,” the
program he outlines (another Borgesian list) fails to convince owing to its disparate and
arbitrary nature; the “mother in rags” reminds Napoleon of his “promise to abolish poverty”; a
“dagger pointed toward the emperor” warns him of the need to pursue “peace”; “hope” is
“embodied in nature,” and so forth (C, pp. 57, 62). In essence, Herding is caught between two
antithetical positions, articulated in the title of his essay on the late landscapes, “Equality and
Authority in Courbet’s Landscape Painting”: either The Painter’s Studio manifests the former or
serves as a vehicle for the latter. The impossibility of the choice leaves him twisting between
contradictory propositions; he claims both that “Courbet made himself the fulcrum around which
everything revolves” (without providing any account of what might qualify as a pictorial sign of any
such revolving about the center) and that “Courbet has relinquished . . . hierarchy by depicting a
number of authorities all of whom have equal compositional rank” (C, pp. 56, 61).
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dence. Yet just as Courbet shifts the act of painting from outside to inside
the scene, so too viewing, as personified by the little boy looking toward the
depicted Courbet’s landscape, is fully within the game of the studio. Like
the depicted Courbet, he focuses his attention only on the landscape rather
than taking in the full gathering. Like the depicted Courbet, he too is only
one player, one reentrant point among many. The activity of viewing, like
that of painting, does not precede the formation of the scene, nor does it
encompass it all at the end of the process through means of a commanding
omniscience. Rather, it emerges in unpredictable ways as viewers—the
depicted one and the actual one alike—interact with the chaotic field and
its collection of anomalous rents spreading across The Painter’s Studio.
If this gathering of individuals and types fails to perform like proper
vassals following the commands of a directing authority, how do they
behave? Like the deer in The Roe Deer’s Retreat in Winter (to which I have
already been alluding), they wander into the relative uniform chaos of this
sylvan clearing as so many reentrant points of higher organization, thereby
distinguishing themselves from their setting but, in formal terms at least,
not much one from the other. Describing the creatures in that manner
suggests an even more apt analogy: Courbet’s assembled characters in The
Painter’s Studio behave like (dare I say it? represent) brushstrokes. There
are a few moments in The Painter’s Studio where loose technique makes a
splash in the manner of the waves crashing in The Waterspout, Etretat
(most notably, in the thick pile of white pigment on the depicted artist’s
palette tipped outwards toward us, which does not represent paint on a
surface, but rather is paint on a surface), but for the most part the enor-
mous size of this work and the relative uniformity of treatment across most
of it tend to rob painting technique here of the capacity it has in smaller
works to represent anomalous reentrance. Rather, the visitors to the
studio manage to distribute themselves, in the emergent manner of
such things in both nature and painting, with the same general texture
of regularity and exception that we witnessed in the scenes of winter
forest and tempestuous sea. Order is not imposed from above; it self-
generates from below. In essence, the entire social world of Courbet’s
cast of characters, including the activities of painting and of viewing
painting, is squeezed between the plane of nature, in the form of the
background landscape, and the plane of painting, as made manifest by
the actual surface of The Painter’s Studio. (Squeezed but not squeezed
flat—all three still have their rents.) And to the extent that those two
planes are selfsame, that the actual Courbet utterly fails to hold them
apart through a credible fiction of recessional space, society also be-
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comes indistinguishable from nature and painting, made equivalent to
these two entities which are already equivalent to each other.
“On the right are the shareholders [actionnaires], that is, friends, work-
ers, devotees of the art world,” explained Courbet in the letter to Champ-
fleury (“L,” p. 131). Actionnaires: a curious word to describe one’s supporters
and mates. With it the artist does not position himself as the autocrat either of
this particular coterie or of his own artistic enterprise. Rather, the friends
take the action of investing something in Courbet, presumably with the
expectation of some return. The social circle operates according to the
dynamics of a market, with winners and losers emerging in the play of
the game. With The Painter’s Studio, moreover, Courbet engaged in a ma-
jor speculation of his own.47 In 1855 the regular salon was, by imperial decree,
to be held as a World Exhibition of Fine Arts in conjunction with the World
Exhibition of Industry, the second Exposition Universelle mounted in the
French capital. Napoleon III’s Director of Fine Arts Alfred-Emilien Nieu-
werkerke approached Courbet in 1853 about contributing to the exhibition
and receiving a government commission, but the artist rebuffed him “because
[Nieuwerkerke] was stating to me that he was a government and because I did
not feel that I was in any way a part of that government.”48 Instead, following
the jury’s rejection of The Painter’s Studio (probably owing to its impossible
size), Courbet funded his own Pavillon du Re´alisme, across from the official
Palais des Beaux-Arts, in which he exhibited thirty-nine paintings and four
drawings, with The Painter’s Studio as the featured work. The initiative was a
commercial disaster; Courbet failed to cover his costs despite repeatedly low-
ering the admission fee to attract more visitors. Nonetheless, the artist stood
on principle: art was to achieve success not by receiving an official stamp of
approval from above but rather by soliciting support from the collectivity of
players in the art market below.49
Listen, finally, to the anarcho-socialist political ideas of Proudhon,
Courbet’s friend who figures among the actionnaires at the right side of The
Painter’s Studio:
What is the Social Contract? Is it an agreement between citizen and
government? No. . . . The social contract is an agreement between
man and man, from which what we call society must emerge. . . .
47. Herding relates the tale in C, pp. 50–55; Cars describes the Pavillon du Re´alisme in his
“The Painter’s Studio,” p. 220.
48. Courbet, letter to Bruyas, [Oct. (?) 1853], The Letters of Gustave Courbet, p. 115.
49. Thus, while I would agree with Herding that “the material and ideological conditions
represented by the World Fair project were constitutive for the genesis of The Painter’s Studio,” we
would tend to argue so for opposing reasons: Herding because the occasion provided Courbet an oppor-
tunity to exhort imperial authority, and I because it allowed him summarily to reject it (C, p. 55).
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It is the relationship between the different parts that produces
power in society and is the reality of the society itself. . . .
Business transactions and exchange alone produce the social order.
In these conditions each man could call himself his own master,
which is the very opposite of constitutional monarchy. . . .
When politics and home life have become one and the same
thing, . . . society’s laws will operate by themselves through universal
spontaneity, and they will not have to be ordered or controlled.50
It isn’t as if society as Proudhon envisioned it lacks order. Rather, it re-
places order imposed from above with order emerging from below. With
all actors reacting to their own local conditions—“the reasons of the citi-
zen . . . are always more or less specific and individual” (SWP, pp. 101–2)—
each establishes proximate relationships with other actors. With time,
larger structures of social organization spontaneously self-generate. The
imposition of a single autocratic will, “dynastic, aristocratic, or clerical,”
distorts the natural course of this “collective reason” (SWP, pp. 101, 121).
If Proudhon was describing the true character of social interaction, if
Courbet was justified in receiving validation not from imperial approval
but through the forces of the free art market, then, in The Painter’s Studio,
the artist has once again sought out some aspect of the material world that
he can represent without trickery because the characteristics of that world
resemble the physical properties of paint. Just as The Waterspout, Etretat
selects those aspects of cliff, water, and sky that correspond to the charac-
teristics of paint on canvas, just as The Roe Deer’s Shelter in Winter discerns
and echoes the forest’s juxtaposition of anomalous reentrance against the
chaotic screen, so too The Painter’s Studio disposes its figures in such a way
as to recapitulate society’s tendency—and nature’s, and painting’s—to
manifest moments of higher organization that spontaneously emerge
from the ambient noise of constant local interactions.
Let us be clear about what is not happening here. The Painter’s Studio is not
an allegory of Proudhon’s politics. Proudhon does not provide the master key
waiting to unlock the meaning of this painting. An allegory requires an au-
thority governing the production or reception of meaning, and neither Cour-
bet’s approach to painting nor Proudhon’s to politics allows a place for the
“occult, mystic power” (Proudhon’s words) of such a “sovereign” (SWP, p.
100). The concept contained within Courbet’s subtitle of Real Allegory acti-
50. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Selected Writings of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, trans. Elizabeth
Fraser, ed. Steward Edwards (Garden City, N.Y., 1969), pp. 96, 113, 91, and 92; hereafter
abbreviated SWP. The passages are taken from publications ranging in date from 1851 to 1864; I
have rearranged them into chronological order.
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vates a process, punching out semiotic depth across the picture rather than
underwriting a determinate meaning. In this regard, Courbet’s painting and
Proudhon’s politics are actually both fundamentally antiallegorical, and yet
neither of them thereby reduces image or society down to a field of flat uni-
formity. The painting is also antirealist, in that it never pretends to make the
world fully visible on its surface. Courbet’s painting and Proudhon’s politics
do not allegorize each other; nor does resemblance between painting and pol-
itics here operate in any strong, iconic manner (by both being flat, for in-
stance). They are similar to each other only in the sense in which the first
strands of life resemble a hunter or a deer resembles an econometric model.
They constitute a match not so much between parallel formal structures as
between parallel processes of emergence—and the matchmaker himself can
only act as one more player in this undetermined game.
So perhaps, in the end, the Courbet depicted working on his canvas actually
is portraying the scene lying before his eyes within the studio before him: not
its specific content—which may not much matter and lies deep within the
picture beyond the reach of scholarship if it exists at all—but its general texture
and its dynamic of emergence. The picture-within-a-picture actually seems to
merge The Waterspout, Etretat and The Roe Deer’s Shelter in Winter, for it
places a splash of water, at lower left, within the relatively uniform chaos of a
forest landscape. Could there be any better way to represent the rent of indi-
viduals as they populate this social scene? Really, The Painter’s Studio is not an
ambitious work by the standards laid down by history painting. It does not
aspire to dissimulate and then triumphantly reveal a big meaning. Neither
does it wear its meaning on its sleeve, in the manner of realism. Trying to
determine whether The Painter’s Studio is allegorical or realist is thus to
confront the picture with the wrong question. Courbet’s canvas no more
awaits the decipherment of its allegory than life has a meaning or markets
are directed toward an end. But to say that is not to reduce The Painter’s
Studio down to a field of uniform brushstrokes (or “equal” elements, to
reactivate the facile political metaphor) any more than it is to regard life as
just so many organic molecules or markets as simply the sum total of its
individual participants’ greed and fear. With the painting forging an ap-
proach that both splits the difference between and eschews altogether the
stark alternatives laid down by this tired dichotomy pitting allegory against
realism, the artist and viewer alike can only embark on the uncertainty of the
hunt after quarry neither fully present nor irrevocably absent. Like the late
landscapes, The Painter’s Studio operates by the logic of the multiplicity of
brushstrokes incommensurate with what they depict, even if brushstrokes
themselves don’t play much of a role here. The picture allows society, like
nature, like the artistic persona of Courbet, like painting itself, to emerge.
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